Negligence – Bus crash | Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly

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Where the plaintiff insurer of a bus that was involved in a fatal accident commenced an interpleader action and has moved for leave to amend the complaint to include negligence claims against two employees of Brandeis University, the motion should be allowed in part and denied in part, as the insurer has alleged a plausible claim for negligence against one of the two employees based on evidence demonstrating that employee’s knowledge of safety concerns and an ability to do something about them.

“This case arises from a serious bus crash that occurred on November 19, 2022. The bus was owned by Joseph’s Transportation, Inc. (‘Joseph’s Transportation’) which had contracted with Brandeis University (‘Brandeis’) to run a shuttle service from the Brandeis campus to Boston/Cambridge. The crash resulted in one fatal injury and several serious but non-fatal injuries to Brandeis students who were passengers on the bus. Following the accident, Jose Lopez (‘plaintiff’) brought suit against Joseph’s Transportation and Jean Fenelon, the operator of the bus at the time of the crash. Commerce Insurance Company, the insurer of the bus, thereinafter commenced an interpleader action against Brandeis, Joseph’s Transportation, Jean Fenelon, and various claimants and potential claimants. Presently before the court is plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint to include negligence claims against Brandeis University and two Brandeis employees, Matthew Rushton and John Storti. For the following reasons, the plaintiff’s motion is allowed as to Brandeis and Mr. Rushton, and denied as to Mr. Storti. …

“… In the university-student context, the ‘distinctive relationship between colleges and their students’ leads to a reasonable expectation that ‘reasonable care will be exercised’ to protect college students from ‘foreseeable harm.’ Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 389 Mass. 47, 54-57 (1983) (‘Pine Manor’). …

“The plaintiff alleges that Mr. Rushton owed Brandeis students a duty because he had actual knowledge of safety related issues involving Joseph’s Transportation, and failed to act appropriately in light of that knowledge. Mr. Rushton responds by arguing that no duty was owed or breached, the allegations are premised on his status as an employee of Brandeis rather than his own actual conduct, and that Mr. Rushton lacked knowledge of relevant issues prior to the accident. The SJC’s decision in Pine Manor is instructive. … There, the court held that the vice president for operations (‘VP’) of Pine Manor College could be held liable for injuries the plaintiff suffered when she was sexually assaulted on campus. … The SJC affirmed judgments against the Pine Manor VP, rejecting his arguments that the criminal attack was not foreseeable. …

“Here, Mr. Rushton was responsible for a broad range of responsibilities related to campus bus transportation and exercised a significant level of control over Joseph’s Transportation, similar to the VP’s responsibilities in Pine Manor. … Mr. Rushton was responsible for supervising Joseph’s Transportation daily operations and investigating student complaints regarding bus transportation. Mr. Rushton was aware of specific safety concerns raised by a student on a Joseph’s Transportation bus. … Mr. Rushton also received a complaint and video of one bus driving with an opened bus door. This knowledge and concern is evident in Mr. Rushton’s attempt to reach out via email to Joseph’s Transportation to try and set up a meeting to discuss the ‘number of complaints’ he had received about the transportation, although such a meeting did not occur. Further, Joseph’s Transportation reached out to Mr. Rushton, via email, in the month prior to the accident inquiring whether one of their drivers should be disciplined because of ‘serious safety concerns,’ even though Mr. Rushton did not respond. Although the identity of that driver of concern is unknown, the email from Joseph’s shows its willingness to defer to Mr. Rushton’s guidance on how to discipline its drivers, reflecting Mr. Rushton’s ability to control. Combined, this evidence demonstrates Mr. Rushton’s knowledge of safety concerns and an ability to do something about those safety concerns. …

“For those reasons, the plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint to permit a negligence claim against Mr. Rushton is allowed. …

“Having concluded that the plaintiff has alleged a plausible claim for negligence against Mr. Rushton, plaintiff’s negligence claim against Brandeis likewise is not futile. … Because Brandeis is liable for the actions of its employee, Mr. Rushton, the plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint to assert a negligence claim against Brandeis is allowed. …

“The proposed claims against Mr. Storti are on different footing. The plaintiff alleges Mr. Storti’s decision to procure bus transportation without requiring seatbelts and his failure to appropriately monitor GPS tracking of Joseph’s buses, breached his duty of care to Brandeis students. Mr. Storti argues that plaintiff has not alleged facts that support that Mr. Storti owed, or breached, a duty to Brandeis students. I agree with Mr. Storti. As to Mr. Storti, plaintiff does not allege the same knowledge or level of control possessed by Mr. Rushton, or similar to the VP in Pine Manor. … The plaintiff cites no case law establishing a duty in Massachusetts that buses must provide seatbelts to riders. Plaintiff advances no allegations that Mr. Storti was aware of specific safety concerns pertaining to the operation of Joseph’s Transportation buses. Although Mr. Storti’s was responsible for negotiating and procuring the transportation contract, that responsibility by itself does not result in the ability to exert control over Joseph’s Transportation’s daily operations. Because he did not possess the same knowledge as Mr. Rushton regarding safety concerns, and he did not have the same ability to control Josephs’ bus services, the negligence claim against Mr. Storti would be futile. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint to include a negligence claim against Mr. Storti is denied.”

Commerce Insurance Co. v. Lopez, et al. (and a companion case) (Lawyers Weekly No. 09-123-25) (8 pages) (Barry-Smith, J.) (Suffolk Superior Court) (Civil Action No. 2384cv01359-BLS1) (Aug. 6, 2025).

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