Negligence – Informed consent – Expert

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Where summary judgment was awarded to a defendant doctor on an informed consent claim that was brought following a forceps-assisted delivery that resulted in a fractured pelvis, the judgment should be affirmed based on a lack of expert testimony that the medical procedure at issue posed a more than negligible risk of a pelvic fracture.

“In this appeal, a husband and wife challenge a grant of summary judgment that dismissed their claim against, among others, a doctor and the limited liability company for which he works. The plaintiffs filed the claim in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging that the defendants violated Massachusetts law because the doctor failed to obtain the wife’s informed consent before he performed a forceps-assisted delivery of her son that fractured her pelvis. The plaintiffs argue on appeal that the grant of summary judgment must be vacated because the District Court abused its discretion in striking their expert witnesses or, in the alternative, that the grant of summary judgment must be reversed because a reasonable juror could supportably find for them on their claim based on ‘common knowledge.’ We affirm. …

“The plaintiffs, Rohini Meka and her husband, Suresh Chirumamilla, filed suit on September 18, 2020, in the District of Massachusetts. They named as defendants Dr. Hani Haddad, Valley Women’s Health Group, LLC, and Jane/John Doe (collectively, ‘the defendants’). …

“We also see no merit in the plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the District Court’s order granting summary judgment on their informed consent claim must be reversed because a reasonable juror could find for them on this claim even in the absence of supporting expert testimony. They argue that deposition testimony establishes that ‘Dr. Haddad failed to offer them a cesarean section and failed to disclose any risks (either maternal or fetal) associated with a forceps (vaginal) delivery,’ and that expert testimony is not required to establish causation because, based on Meka’s medical records and testimony that will be introduced at trial, a ‘jury [would be] able to reasonably conclude that the [pelvic] fracture occurred during [the] forceps delivery.’

“The defendants question the plaintiffs’ characterization of Massachusetts law. They contend, based on Precourt v. Frederick, 481 N.E.2d 1144, 1148-49 (Mass. 1985), that to prove a claim alleging a failure to obtain informed consent for a medical procedure, a plaintiff must prove that the assertedly undisclosed risk posed by the medical procedure was non-negligible and that the failure to disclose that risk caused the alleged injury. The defendants then further contend that, in the plaintiffs’ case, neither of these elements of their informed consent claim could be established under Massachusetts law without expert testimony. Reviewing de novo while taking the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, … we agree with the defendants as to the need for expert testimony concerning the nature of the undisclosed risk and so do not address their contention regarding the need for expert testimony concerning causation.

“… In addition, none of the other precedent or legal provisions plaintiffs invoke address the question of whether expert testimony is needed for them to meet their burden to show that the medical procedure in question here posed a more-than-negligible risk of a pelvic fracture. We thus see no basis for reversing the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the sole claim that is at issue in this appeal.”

Meka, et al. v. Haddad, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 01-211-25) (14 pages) (Barron, C.J.) Appealed from a decision by Mastroianni, J., in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Ingrid A. Halstrom, with whom Halstrom Law Offices, P.C., was on brief, for the plaintiffs-appellants; Michael R. Lavoie, with whom Dennis R. Anti and Morrison Mahoney LLP were on brief, for the defendants-appellees (Docket No. 24-1425) (Oct. 9, 2025).

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